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Jo Fox 
S ome of the most enduring propaganda images and slogans of the Second World War emerged from the so-called careless talk campaigns in Britain. Catchphrases such as "Careless Talk Costs Lives" have entered the com- mon lexicon, while Fougasse's famous posters of Hitler and Goering eavesdropping 
on the unwise gossip of two female shoppers have been the subject of numerous 
pastiches by cartoonists on modern political crises, including the recent conflict 
in Iraq. ' The longevity of these phrases and images is explained not just because 
they were textually and visually striking but also because they were unusual in 
character. They simultaneously evoke notions of British resilience and sacrifice and 
an enduring anxiety provoked by the threat of Nazism. This tension stems from 
the fact that 'while national wartime propaganda tended to promote a positive, 
united "world view, " the careless talk initiatives had a quite different impetus. As 
campaigns concerned with the internal security aims of eliminating opportunities 
for damaging rumors to spread and with identifying potential "fifth columnists, " 
these campaigns encouraged a "closing of the ranks" and a suspicion toward others. 
As such, they ran the risk of disrupting the wartime master narrative of the 
"People's War. " 
The careless talk campaigns have received relatively little scholarly attention. 
They are barely mentioned in wider studies of Britain during the Second World 
War. ' Works that do consider the campaigns either confine them to a specific 
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period (notably May-August 1940), focus on one mode of communication, such 
as the poster, or view them as part of a coherent and unchanging propaganda 
offensive without considering their place within the broader spectrum of domestic 
propaganda initiatives. ' Tracking the campaigns from 1939 to 1945 reveals the 
finer shifts and tensions within wartime propaganda. Moreover, for a fuller un- 
derstanding of the nature of wartime propaganda, these campaigns must be con- 
sidered together, since this was how the public received them, and this created 
the environment in which meanings were established. In taking this approach, the 
careless talk initiatives assume a particular significance. They reveal how official 
propaganda campaigns could he undermined from within. Films, posters, press 
advertising, and other forms of persuasion did not present a clear and consistent 
image to the British people. This is true even within the careless talk campaigns 
themselves; it is still more so when these are set alongside simultaneous appeals 
designed to stress the shared interest in national unity. While the "pull to unity" 
may have "dominated popular culture" and the attempts to celebrate the "ordi- 
nary" in wartime Britain, as Sonya Rose argues, the careless talk campaigns gen- 
erated by the Ministry of IntOrmation (MOI ) and other government agencies 
promoted a different culture-one of distrust, suspicion, and fear, where such 
aspects of "ordinary" lite as conversational gossip were presented as dangerous. Y 
The campaigns cast the entire population as potential suspects who lacked disci- 
pline, and whose words and private thoughts required control. This contrast be- 
nveen the government's attempts to consolidate national unity and its warnings 
against careless talk made official propaganda volatile in its effects. As Rose further 
obse ryes, the "hegemonie power" of ideas such as the "People's War" was not 
uniform or unvarying; such power also "produces and contains possibilities that 
make it unstable and capable of metamorphosis, reinforcing, or unleashing political 
and institutional currents that run counter to it. "` 
This article investigates the dynamics within the major security campaigns from 
the initial publicity of 1939 and the 1940 
"Silent Coltln111" initiative to the prep- 
arations for l)-Day. It considers how the campaigns were adapted to different 
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phases of the war, why the campaigns were intensified, what key themes were 
addressed, and what impact the campaigns had on popular behaviors and men- 
talities. Examination of public reactions to the careless talk campaigns unveils a 
series of unforeseen and undesired responses to government security propaganda, 
each provoking particular wartime mentalities: fear, anger, distancing, and deper- 
sonalization. Moreover, the campaigns incited a public counternarrative of British 
identity. This centered on the rejection of any kind of authoritarian vision, en- 
couraged a debate that questioned the relationships between the state and the 
individual, and reemphasized freedom and privacy as key constituents of British- 
ness. The article reveals how alternative messages complicated and even under- 
mined the Ministry of Information's home front propaganda. It points to the 
fissures not simply in the lived realities of the home front, but in the very projection 
of the People's War in British propaganda and the popular imagination. If, as Rose 
argues, the nation was "being imagined as a unified community of people capable 
of putting the national interest above their own needs and desires, " this imagination 
was both muddled and contested. ' 
00m 
Propaganda campaigns concerned with internal security began to take shape 
early in the war. The War Cabinet established a "Committee on the Issue of 
Warnings against Discussion of Confidential Matters in Public Places. " The Com- 
mittee met for the first time on 13 October 1939 to consider security in the 
Services and the possibility of a domestic awareness campaign to he spearheaded 
by the newly formed Ministry of Information (MOI ). ' Comprising representatives 
from the Air Ministry, the Ministry of Supply, the Admiralty, the Home Office, 
the W'e'ar Office, the Treasury, and the MOI, the Committee considered action 
already taken and planned future campaigns to prevent the spread of careless talk. 
On 13 November, it reported to Cabinet that appropriate measures were in place 
for His Majesty's Forces, the Civil Service, the Merchant Navy, the Police and 
Fire Service, Civil Defence, and armaments factories. By this stage 541,000 posters 
had been distributed to hotels and public houses, 21,000 to the Post Office, 50,000 
to local authorities, 5,000 to labor exchanges, and 4,250 to railways and docks. 
The MOI had enlisted the help of the press in placing articles in newspapers and 
secured the BBC's agreement to produce special radio programs. Security "notices 
[ were ] to he thrown on to the screens of cinemas" before the main feature. The 
Ministry of Transport pledged to "increase lighting of railway carriages on long- 
distance night journeys" to encourage passengers to "read rather than to talk, " 
recognizing that "the dimly-lit railway carriage on night journeys is a very fertile 
breeding-ground for indiscreet talk with or in the presence of' strangers. " Prose- 
cutions for careless talk would he publicized as a deterrent, and the public would 
receive "guidance" as to what constituted a breach of Defence Regulations. The 
Committee concluded that it was "now satisfied that no further action, apart from 
" Sonva Rose, "Sex, Citizenship, and the Nation in World War II Britain, " American Historical 
Review 103, no. 4t October 1998): 1175. 
Minutes of the Committee on the Issue of Warnings against Discussion of Confidential Matters in 
Public Places, 8 November 1939, The National Archives (TNA): Records of the Cabinet Office (CAB) 
67/2/38. 
BRITISH DOMESTIC PROPAGANDA DURING WORLD WAR 11   939 
that which we have already set in train, is required, " although the matter would 
he kept under "periodic review to ensure that notices and warnings retain their 
effectiveness by repetition and variety. ` The initial approach to security propa- 
ganda, then, was careful and understated, beginning with the "Keep It Dark" 
initiative of November 1939 and the further issue of posters in December 1939 
warning the public against indiscreet talk that might provide information to the 
enemy. 
The Committee's work continued into early 1940 with the launch of a new 
security campaign in February. It secured over 2 million display sites for new 
artwork, translated slogans into Welsh, and commissioned special posters for Scot- 
tish ports. The artist Norman Wilkinson, who also worked on ship camouflage, 
produced images of sinking ships for posters distributed to factories, and "Fou- 
gasse" (the pseudonym of cartoonist Cyril Bird) sketched a series of cartoons 
around the theme of overheard conversations in public places. Of the 2,250,100 
posters distributed, 734,200 were in the Fougasse series, with a further reprint 
of 248,000 in March. Ealing Studios produced three short films on security mat- 
ters, the BBC planned further "anti-gossip" talks, and there were attempts to enlist 
the support of such literary figures as Somerset MMaugham, Agatha Christie, and 
F. M. Delafield. ' Prestigious social clubs received "a dignified card-in the style 
of important invitations-stating that `members are earnestly requested to he dis- 
creet in discussing naval, military and air affairs. "'" 
As this initiative suggests, as well as conveying a broad message applicable to 
all, propaganda was developed along class lines. While intended to target specific 
audiences, such an approach had the potential to divide rather than unite, and 
there were soon difficulties. The three short films produced for the February- 
March 1940 security drive drew criticism for their class-hound approach. Directed 
by John Paddy Carstairs and screened in 2,000 cinemas with a potential audience 
of 20 million, Neu' You're Talkie i q, Dangerous ('om; ne; it, and All Hands depicted 
three examples of indiscreet talk by the Navy, within a scientific research unit, and 
among RAF officers. ' While commentators agreed on the importance of the 
message, Mass-Observation, an organization set up in 1937 to record popular 
views on a variety of matters, described adverse audience reactions due to the films' 
"essentially upper and middle class attitude" in a report on MOI short films. In 
all three security films, the report commented, "the spy was a worker (barman, 
cafe proprietress, pub crawler), while in two of them the gossipers wcre working 
class. The hero ofone of these films, a factory scientist with a beautiful large house, 
is killed by the idiocy of a factory worker. The hero of another is a rich young 
Ibid. 
"Keep It Dark" poster issued in November 1939, TNA: Records created or inherited by the Central 
Office of Intiýrmation, here the records of the Ministry of Information !t INF ! 2/9,5, "Warning: Be on 
four Guard, " poster issued in December 1939, TNA: INF 2/95. Sec also Norman Longmate, Hou' 
We Lired Then: A History of Errervdav Ltfe during the Second 1%Orld War (London, 1971 96; and 
Lewis, "`Careless Talk Costs Lives, "' 45. 
"' Report from the Committee on the Issue of Vs arnings against Discussion of Confidential Matters 
in Public Places, to the War Cabinet, 13 March 1940, TNA: CAR 67/. 5 /29. 
The Times, 7 February 1940,5. 
Daily Mirror, 21 March 1940, S. See also 1O Topic Collection (I (' 42 on this campaign, Mass- 
Observation Archisc Online, Adam Matthew Education (hereafter NI-O A). 
940   FOX 
airman, his fiance lived in a luxury flat. "'' Although in this respect the films proved 
problematic, particularly as the MOI began to notice an "increase in [public] class 
resentment, " the wider internal security campaigns met with a favorable response. ' 
They even prompted voluntary action at a local level. The Weymouth Co-operative, 
for example, fined customers who uttered "have you heard? " to fellow shoppers, 
while Southampton established a Home Security League to "help maintain a high 
standard of public morale by personal cheerfulness and by killing rumours. "' 
During the early careless talk campaigns, reports on morale and public reaction 
to publicity campaigns, such as those produced by Mass-Observation, only reached 
government departments sporadically. This changed in 1940, and the flow of 
information to central government increased exponentially. Reflecting concerns 
that Mass-Observation's methods were unscientific and that the cost of their ser- 
vices could escalate, the 11\101 established a Home Intelligence Division with Mary 
Adams, a former producer with the BBC's early television service, as its director. 
The Division's aims, according to Adams, were "to provide a basis for publicity 
[ and ]... to provide an assessment of home morale. "' It produced reports for 
use within the MOI and other government departments (Home Security, Labour, 
Supply, the War Office, and the Air Ministry) with a total circulation of around 
one hundred copies, twenty-five of which were distributed outside the N101.1- 
These reports were issued monthly until May 1940, then daily from 18 May to 
27 September 1940 (except on Sundays), with weekly Summaries thereafter. " 
The main body of the reports was drawn from the network of Regional Infor- 
mation Officers (RIOs) based in thirteen regional centers. '" RIO reports were an 
important local barometer of public opinion. Telephoning in their data early each 
afternoon during the peak period of Home Intelligence's activities from May to 
September 1940, they offered excerpts from 'discussions from their own staff, 
... casual conversations 
initiated or overheard on the way to work, ... 
( or from 
talking to people during a hurried series of visits to public houses, and other 
places where the public foregathered. 40') 20 IA)ndon had a dedicated section in each 
File report (FRi 45g, "\IOI Shorts, " 2, October 1940, M-O A. The films were launched as part 
of the interdepartmental anti-gossip initiative, "Summary Report ()fan Inter-Departmental Meeting, " 
7 March 1940, TNA: Home Office HO 144! 2197;;. For scripts of the films, sec TNA: INF 0/525, 
INF 6/56, and INF 6/57. 
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report, reflecting the "special arrangements" in place for the capital, which drew 
on contacts with "a number of people ... 
in all strata of society, who would be 
prepared, in response to a telephone call or a personal visit, to report the feelings 
of those with whom they came into contact. " These contacts ranged from doctors 
and parsons to newsagents and shop stewards. '' 
In addition to RIOs, Home Intelligence drew on various other sources: "BBC 
Listener research surveys ... , questionnaires completed 
by such organizations as 
W. H. Smith and Sons, the London Passenger Transport Board, Citizens' Advice 
Bureaux, the Association of Women House Property Managers and the Brewers' 
Society, " alongside information from "postal censors, " the Police, and Mass-Ob- 
servation. " The use of ýM-lass-Observation proved controversial since its early coin- 
missions from government agencies in June 1939: two of the organization's foun- 
ders', Tom Harrisson and Charles Nladge, quarreled over whether government 
contracts would affect Mass-Observation's independence, while skeptical civil ser- 
vants and ministers thought its methods unreliable and costly. Despite her support 
for Mass-Observation, Adams struggled to retain its services, eventually losing the 
battle On 30 September 1941. ' Government preferred the quantitative methods 
of its own Wartime Social Survey (established by Arnold Plant at the National 
Institute of Social and Economic Research) to the qualitative data produced by 
. glass-Observation. 4 
In the period between the establishment of the 
Committee 
on the Issue of 
Warnings against Discussion Of C. Ontidential . 'Matters in Public Places and the 
second phase of the security campaign in February and March 1940, a vast ap- 
paratus designed to record and report on public morale had thus been erected, 
and this had consequences for any future careless talk initiatives. On the One 
hand, 
as Paul Addison and Jeremy Crang point out, up until the advent of the Home 
Intelligence Division, the N-1OI "was talking to Britain without listening to Brit- ain. " Clearly, material gathered by the unit could he used by government de- 
partments to conduct more effective and penetrating propaganda. 25 On the Other 
hand, the very existence Ot the Home Intelligence Division and its Subdivision, 
the Wartime Social Survey, compounded with the increased emphasis on careless 
talk and the publicity surrounding convictions under the Civil Defence acts, was 
a potent combination that, III the public mind, threatened the foundations Of the 
democratic state. This led to greater scrutiny of the N101 and its activities and 
came to a head in the crisis over the security campaigns of July 1940. 
0mm 
In May 1940, Home Intelligence became increasingly alarmed at the levels of 
rumor and gossip among the population. It reported that "the rumour situation 
is becoming so serious that it becomes imperative for the whole matter to he 
,; 
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discussed in detail. 
... 
Enemy agents may be at work and there is malicious 
gossiping but evidence before us at the moment suggests that most rumours are 
passed on by idle, frightened suspicious people. " )6 Such behaviors reflected the 
public mood in May-June 1940. Home Intelligence reports from this period 
frequently alluded to the popular belief in the existence of a British fifth column. ` 
Mass-Observation recorded that between 20 May and 5 June 1940 the fifth column 
was the leading subject of rumors in circulation. `' The popularity of spy literature 
and films and the broadcasts of Lord Haw-Haw, whose listenership of 9 million 
also peaked in May and June 1940, no doubt fueled already fertile imaginations. 2 
These reports, combined with events in the war itself, convinced the MOI that a 
more direct and restrictive strategy for internal security propaganda was necessary. 
Following the invasion of the Low Countries, the evacuation of the British Ex- 
peditionary Force from Dunkirk, and the fall of France, Britain was isolated. Any 
information passed to the enemy could inform a planned invasion by supplying 
important details to the Luthvaffe and Kriegsmarine. 
It was in this context of public anxiety and threatened invasion that the MOI 
considered new measures in their careless talk publicity. "What the public desired, " 
the Ministry concluded, was "not so much words of comfort as words of com - 
mand. "; " Taking control of the public mood was chief among the concerns of the 
new prime minister, Winston Churchill, who took office in May 1940. In June, 
General Ismay reported the disastrous effects of rumor on morale during the 
Dunkirk evacuation. As a consequence, Churchill ordered a reinvigoration of se- 
curity publicity: government propaganda now encouraged Britons to join the "Si- 
lent Column. ;' 
Kenneth Clark, Controller of Home Publicity at the MOI, was responsible for 
directing the initiative.; ' The campaigns would cover both rumor emanating from 
abroad and gossip circulating at home. This blurred the distinctions between 
external foes and internal fools, an approach which it was agreed would require 
"careful handling. ";; On Monday 8 July, the NIOI's Planning Committee con- 
firmed the decision to implement a "Silent Column" campaign, with the Minister 
Home Intelligence Report, 24 May 1940 in Addison and (; rang, Liste"ninq to Britain, 31. 
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was just 2 percent. FR 773, "Comparative Report on War Diaries, " July 1941, A. 
FR 223, "General Report from Mass-Observation in Rumour, " 22 June 1940, M -O A. 
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Seep it to yourself 
and make 
others do the same 
ISSUED äY THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION 
Figure 1-Silent Column advertisement, as it appeared in, e. g., The Times, 12 Jule 1940. Images 
have been reproduced with the kind permission of the National Archives (Kew). 
of Information, I)uft ('ooper, to broadcast to the nation on the Thursday. " Details 
would he issued to the Press thirty-six hours before the first advertisement was 
due to appear and twenty-tour hours before the broadcast, in the hope that the 
campaign would attract positive editorial comment, as had been the case with the 
February initiative. " From the outset, citizens' responsibilities were central to the 
appeal, and the campaign was conceived as an "invitation" to "every patriotic 
citizen to enrol. 
However, unlike the security campaigns of February 1940, the advertise- 
ments-such as that in figure 1, which appeared in newspapers on 12 Jule-and 
Duff C'ooper's broadcast on II Jul\' undermined public engagement with the idea 
()f citizenship promoted by the government. They differed from previous appeals 
in their graveness and their sense of compulsion (, to "snake" others behave in a 
certain way). As psychological historian Nikolas Rose has suggested, this type of 
propaganda "sought to produce shame, guilt and condemnation, rather than seeing 
rumour as arising from specifiable psychological conditions. Consequently, the 
N101 began to receive reports indicating "a growing feeling that too many cam- 
paigns take the form of unconstructive prohibitions ( Don't gossip, don't spend, 
don't waste, don't listen to enemy broadcasts) and that there was "too much 
talking at people nowadays. "? 
" 
Nioreover, in contrast to messages on war aims and those that promoted the 
idea of the People's War, the Silent Column campaigns encouraged suspicion. As 
one Home Intelligence report noted, they transformed the men and women of 
"Churchill's Island" into "a nation of spies, " a perception that was encouraged 
by anti-gossip campaigning and fueled by public interest in and speculation about 
At01 Planning Committee minutc., 8 1ul\- 1940, -I-\A: INF 1 249. 
Note ()n ad ho,: meeting between members of the MO1 Planning 
Committee, Mr. Surrey Dane 
and Mr. Christiansen, 9 July 1940, TNA: INF 1; ' 249. 
Notes On Anti-(; o%sip Campaign, Kenneth Clark, Clark PaperN, Tate Special Collcal0fis. 
Kti 12.1.4.2775. 
Nikeýla. Rose, Gnrr'rntufl the Soul: 71)c tihitpinn o(thr PrtvRte" Sc'l(, London, 1989 i, 26. 
Daily Report on \twalc, 26 Jul' 1940, '1-NA: I\F 1. '264. 
"' Daily Report on M()rale, '2 July 1940, T\A: INF 1 264; 1'oint. from the Rcgion%, 22 July 1940. 
TNA. INF 1! 264. 
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invasion, fifth columnists, and parachutists. `' Even ministers were advised that 
waiters at their favorite Italian restaurant were being employed by the enemy to 
eavesdrop on their lunchtime conversations. ' The smallest of acts could be in- 
terpreted as an unpatriotic gesture. "Those who spread doom and despondency" 
by engaging in defeatist talk, warned Cooper in his broadcast, "do definite harm: 
they are hurting the cause, they are delaying the victory; they are enemies-unin- 
tentional enemies probably-but enemies of our side. "4"The campaign's publicity 
sheets singled out individual "types, " reducing fellow citizens to stereotypes whose 
proclivities were damaging the war effort: Mr. Secrecy Hush Hush, Mr. Knowall, 
Miss Leaky Mouth, Miss Teacup Whisper, Mr. Pride in Prophecy, and Mr. Glumpot 
(see fig. 2 ). 4 These were the new internal enemies. 
Such an accusatory tone prompted widespread popular discontent with the Silent 
Column campaign. The Home Intelligence daily report for London on 23 July 
1940 described "vigorous protests from all classes. "44 Angus Calder explained this 
reaction as "a reflex revulsion against ... 
fifth column mania" and specifically the 
treatment of enemy aliens. 4: -' This is unsatisfactory, since public fascination with 
fifth columnists did not abate, and British sympathy for enemy aliens had its 
limitations, as numerous contemporary sources suggest . 
4' Equally, Calder's inter- 
pretation does not adequately explain the depth of feeling aroused by the Silent 
Column campaign, nor the views expressed in reports sent to the MOI by their 
Regional Information Officers. A detailed examination of RIOs' reports, alongside 
other sources gauging public morale such as Mass-Observation, reveals that, while 
the campaign may have been a short-term failure, disrupting the MOI's propa- 
ganda narrative, it had unintended positive consequences. 
Reports to the MOI from their RIOs pointed to a lack of public understanding 
of the Silent Column and alarm at prosecutions under the Civil Defence Act for 
careless talk. 47 In November 1939, the Committee on the Issue of Warnings against 
Discussion of Confidential Matters in Public Places suggested that prosecutions 
for careless talk should receive publicity to demonstrate the personal consequences 
of breaching regulation 3 of the Civil Defence Act. Prosecutions continued 
throughout the conflict. While the trials were not especially numerous (fifty-four 
Report from London, Home Intelligence, n. d., ca. 22 July 1940, TNA: INF 1/264; for speculation 
about invasion, fifth columnists, and parachutists, see, e. g., FR 539, "Note on Rumour, " 8 January 
1941, M-() A. 
4' John Anderson, confidential memorandum, 5 June 1940, TNA: PREM 4/39/9A. 
42 The Times, 12 Jul 1940,2. Author's emphasis. 
Picture Post, 27 Jule 1940. 
44 Report from London, n. d., ca. 23 July 1940, TNA: INF 1/264. 
45 Calder, The Mvth of'the Blitz, 110. 
4`' There are many examples of negative reactions to enemy aliens, citing potential fifth column activity 
as a source of tension between Britons and enemy aliens. See, e. g., the Home Intelligence report of 6 
June 1940 in Addison and (: rang, Listening to Britain, 85; FR 773, "Comparative Report on War 
Diaries, " July 1941, M-O A; FR 1630, "Various Indirects, " March 1943, M-O A. Forty-three percent 
of those questioned by the British Institute of Public Opinion (BIPO) in Jul' 1940 thought that all 
enemy aliens, regardless of whether they presented a danger, should he interned (BIPO report 71, L'K 
Data Archive). 
Daily Report on Morale, 26 July 1940, TNA: INF 1/264. Details of security prosecutions can 
be found in TNA: HO 1 44/2 1 975 and PREM 37/9. See also Minutes of the Committee on the Issue 
of Warnings against Discussion of Confidential Matters in Public Places, 8 November 1939, TNA: 
CAB 67/2/38 for discussion of the Civil Defence Regulations. 
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"guilty" verdicts in the first nine months of 1943, for example), the press often 
reported on them. " Reports of court cases after 1940 tended to he more sedate. 
However, in mid-1940, wild stories of overzealous officials and citizens circulated 
in the press. This eroded the effectiveness of the Silent Column campaign by 
reinforcing the belief that individual rights were being undermined by the state. 
On 19 July, the Manchester Guardian reported on a police raid on the home of 
"an entirely reputable member of the Labour Party. " Local officers confiscated 
"copies of such blameless volumes as Lord Addison's `Policy for Agriculture' and 
the Duchess of Atholl's `Searchlight on Spain. "' The newspaper condemned the 
1\101 for inciting "a sort of amateur Gestapo movement in which a few people 
with nothing better to do would use a lull in the actual operations of war in order 
to foment baseless suspicions against their neighbours, "49 an attitude reinforced 
by the Silent Column's advice to citizens overhearing careless talk to "take out 
an old envelope and start writing down what they are saying. "" The newspaper 
denounced the "orgy of tale-hearing and unedifying police court sentences, " point- 
ing to the tensions between the "ugly batch of convictions" and the N101's "appeal 
to people to he more friendly and neighbourly. " It predicted that "in many of 
these cases most of the damage has been done to a sense of confidence in some 
of our fellow citizens. "; ' Confirming the attitude expressed in the Manchester 
Guardian at the height of the Silent Column campaign, RIOs frequently observed 
that the public noticed discontinuities in government messages, particularly in 
relation to the positioning of the individual and the state. RIOs in Leeds reported 
public "misgiving aroused by the prosecution of prominent S. Yorkshire councillor, 
the basis of the charge apparently being his strong criticism of Chamberlain for 
our unpreparedness, and as a traitor. This contrasted with [ Lord I Halifax's `we 
shall not stop fighting till freedom for ourselves and others is secured. "''' 
Moreover, there was a recognition that government attempts to define a new 
term of citizenship, forged in the crucible of war and centered on the commu- 
nity-a "people's community" that blurred the distinction between home and 
front lines-were being destabilized by the Silent Column campaign. The Daily 
I'Mlorale Report of 20 July 1940 noted that '--the civilian is beginning to feel, and 
has been encouraged to feel, that he is in the front line: at the same time, attempts 
are apparently being made to undermine his status. "'-; Citizens clearly felt that 
their commitment to the war effort should he rewarded yet observed that "the 
Government does not trust the people as much as it ought to, " a later report 
" For examples of publicity given to careless talk prosecutions, see Vie Times, 12 February 1941, 
9; Manchester Guardian, 26 March 1942,6; Daily Express, 8 April 1942,3; Manchester Guardian, 9 
June 1942,3; 23 July 1942,5; 10 December 1942,3; Daily Express, 7 May 1943,1; The Times, 1 
May 1944,2. Herbert Morrison confirmed in response to a question in the House of Conlrllons on 
16 December 1943 that, in the first nine months of 1943, fifty-ttrur individuals \\-ere found guilty of 
breaching regulation 3 ofthe I)etcnce Regulations. Ofthose, thirty-t6ur were tined, thirteen imprisoned, 
and seven put on probation. House of Gammons, 16 December 1943, Parliamentary Debates, ('onl 
mons, 5th , cr., vol. 395 ( 1943-44), cols. 167 2--73. 
'`' Manchester Guardian, 19 July 1940,4. 
"' Silent Column advertisement. For an example of this advertisenlerlt, see Manchester Guardian, 13 
July 1940,8. 
Manchester Guardian, 24 July 1940,4. 
I Pints from the Regions, 23 July 1940, TNA: INF 1/264. 
`' Daily Report on Morale, 20 July 1940, TNA: INF 1/264. 
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added. '4 The Silent Column campaign revealed a prevailing mentality of "them 
and us, " language that appeared frequently in reports sent to the MOI from the 
regions. ' 
This became, in effect, a debate over citizenship and identity. --` "Standards of 
good public conduct" were being shaped from below, and the British public be- 
came actively involved in the process of defining who they were and who they 
were not. British characteristics came to be defined by opposition to the Silent 
Column campaign: the importance of individuality, private lives, and the right to 
free expression. ' The Silent Column campaign prompted a discussion as to in- 
dividual rights that citizens ought to expect, simultaneously defining the external 
"Other"-in this case, authoritarian behaviors. 
In complaining about the Silent Column and prosecutions for "careless talk, " 
the public drew direct comparison with Nazi Germany as a means to demonstrate 
difference: "It's the Gestapo over here"; "They can prevent us talking but they 
can't prevent us thinking"; "This Silent Column Campaign is a backhand. Al- 
though I agree that people shouldn't say dangerous things, this makes you feel 
you daren't say anything. It takes the heart out of you, doesn't it? " Such com- 
ments came at the height of the controversy over "Cooper's Snoopers. " In a willful 
act by the press to undermine the Ministry's credibility and authority, the Wartime 
Social Survey was represented as an official "witch-hunt against innocent civil- 
ians. "~`' The press escalated its critique of the survey by portraying it as an unwanted 
intrusion, with government officials, "Cooper's Snoopers" (the name given to the 
initiative by the press after Duff Cooper, the Minister of Information) peering 
into the minute details of private lives and thoughts in what was seen as a flawed 
attempt to buoy public morale. In this crucial period between Max' and July 1940, 
the combination of government information gathering, prosecutions of those en- 
gaging in careless talk, and the Silent Column campaign all prompted a belief that 
one of the fundamental tenets of British national life, the freedom of the civilian, 
was in jeopardy. Individuals complained that they had been "fighting for freedom 
but losing what freedom we've got, "" which led to accusations that the British 
"regime [was] becoming dangerously akin to the one we are fighting. "" RIOs 
reported that comments on the British government's "authoritarian mentality" 
were becoming commonplace: "best to pass no opinion these days-you might 
`' Points from the Regions, 22 July 1940, TNA: INF 1'264. 
See, e. g., Daily Report on Morale, 17 July 1940, TNA: INF 1/264. 
For further discussion of debates over citizenship and identity at war, sec Rose, Which Peoph-s 
1 it Richard Weight and Abigail Beach, eds., The Right to Belong: (. iti_. enship and Yational Identity 
in Britain, 1930-1960 t London, 1998), and Rose, "Sex, Citizenship, and the Nation. " 
See Michael Frecden. "Civil Society and the Good Citizen: Competing Conceptions of(: itizenship 
in Twentieth-Century Britain, " in Civil Society in British History: Ideas, Identities, Institutions, cd. Jose 
Harns t Oxtiýrd, 2003), 290. 
Daily Report on Morale, 20 July 1940, TNA: INF 1/264. 
Addison and ('rang, Listening to Britain, xv. See also xv-xvi on "C(x)per's Sncxopers. " Mass- 
Observation also reported extensively on the atlair: FR 3 , 
33, "Press Campaign against Dutt Cooper, " 
August 1940, M-() A; FR 325, "Cooper's Snoxopcrs, " August 1940, , '1t-() 
A; FR 336, "Ccxoper's 
Snooper-s, " August 1940, IM-0 A. 
Daily Report on Morale, 17 July 1940, TNA: INF 1 /264. 
"' Points from the Regions, 22 July 1940, TNA: INF 1/264. 
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get hung": "I'm afraid to open my mouth" ; 6' "Most people will soon he afraid 
to say anything. "h" At a Labour party meeting in London, candidates "agreed that 
prosecutions for idle talking were upsetting public morale seriously. People in 
positions of minor authority [are] accused of officiousness and bullying manner, 
reminiscent some say `of the early days of the Nazis. " TM What became known as 
the "Gestapo idea" was relatively widespread, arguably more widespread than the 
essential message about national security, " and "the relationship between the [Si- 
lent Column] campaign and prosecutions for defeatist talk and rumours" was 
deemed "sinister. "" 
The consistent theme of public criticism was the identification of such author- 
itarian and intrusive behavior as "un-British. " This public idealization of liberty 
might in other contexts he celebrated: a Mass-Observation analytical report on 
"What Does Britain Mean to You? " in September 1941 identified a strong cor- 
relation between British identity and "Liberty, love of home, tolerance and jus- 
tice-these are some of the things which Britain has infused into her sons and 
daughters. "'- Indeed, such was the importance of these concepts to perceptions 
of Britishness and their long-standing connection to national "ideologrty" that. M1ass- 
Observation reported that "freedom and tolerance are ... 
looked on by many 
people almost as a British monopoly. " "Imposed authority" was considered an- 
tithetical to the British character, with some respondents even praising ineptness, 
since "efficiency so frequently has its officious side. " On occasion, the two com- 
bined to emphasize the role of the individual in national life: "the freedom of the 
individual is the freedom to he inefficient. " Freedom of thought, opinion, and 
expression were central to national identity and to a sense of the homeland, "where 
there is normally a minimum of interference with the individual. "" Government 
careless talk initiatives between May and July 1940 conflicted, then, with the 
broader rhetoric of civic republicanism developed by government in the 1930s 
and 1940s. 69 This manifested itself during wartime, as Jose Harris has observed, 
in a "strengthening and legitimation of a highly privatised and unstructured psy- 
chological individualism-an individualism that was explicitly opposed to fascism, 
but that also presented definite boundaries to collectivisation of all kinds, " even 
forms of collective action and behaviors that appeared to he in the national 
interest. " 
In addition, within the careless talk campaigns, the ýM Ol made clumsy attempts 
to challenge British mannerisms. In reviewing the ýN101 security short film You're 
Tolling Me (Paul Rotha, 1941), which depicted the effects of gossip and speculation 
on the escalation of rumours, Mass-Observation recorded negative reactions to 
"any propaganda which ... 
implies criticism of British behaviour instead of boasts 
Daily Report on Itiiorale, 17 July 1940, TNA: INF 1/264. 
Points from the Regions, 18 July 1940, TNA: INF 1/264. 
Report from London, n. d., ca. 22 July 1940, TNA: INF 1/264. 
Report from IA)ndon, n. d., TNA: INF 1/264. 
Daily Report on Morale, 22 July 1940, TNA: INF 1/264. 
FR 878, "What Does Britain Mean to Thu? " 23 September 1941, M-O A. 
Ibid. 
Rose, "Sex, Citizenship, and the Nation, " 1170, Freeden, "Civil Societe. " 
'" Jose Harris, "War and Social History: Britain and the Home Front during the Second World War, " 
Contemporary European History 1, no. 1 (1992): 32. 
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for it. "" Behavior, in this case the act of a community sharing information due 
to concern for workers' welfare at Harper's factory, was far more important to 
ideas of Britishness, concluded Mass-Observation, than the "people or land"-it 
was more than a sum total of ... things and people. 
"''` RIOs also observed that 
individuals sought to protect the British habit of complaining, targeted by the 
Silent Column campaigners, and were concerned that there was "no outlet for 
healthy grumbling. "-" Reports confirmed that "many people think that grumbling 
is a British tradition, "'4 as Stanley Baldwin famously identified in his 1924 speech 
to the annual dinner of the Royal Society of St. George. " Not being able to talk 
to others, to gossip, seemed to unravel communities and, more importantly, how 
they were imagined. Home Intelligence commented that the campaign as a whole 
was "creating ... an absence of neighbourliness. 
"7' This approach ultimately had 
the potential to disrupt the master narrative of the People's War and led to ac- 
cusations that the Ministry did not understand the British people. The Daily Evpress 
commented that their notion of national identity seemed "to come out of some 
Victorian school story crammed with prigs and bores, to take down on old en- 
velopes the conversations of rumour-mongers, to indulge in precise and prolonged 
dialogue about victory, and to make noble speeches to ourselves during bom- 
bardments. 
However, while the public and published reaction to the Silent Column initiative 
was overwhelmingly negative and on the surface exposed tensions within govern- 
ment propaganda over the People's War, paradoxically the campaign ultimately 
strengthened national bonds. Britons articulated their collective identity by ex- 
pressing their opposition to authoritarian behavior and their skepticism of a cen- 
tralized state. This identity emerged not from government appeals to create a 
People's War but from a predetermined shared set of values. This provided a clear 
sense of what Britain was fighting for (and against) and contributed indirectly to 
the 1\101's task of raising public morale. 
That said, security publicity continued 
to contain tensions that threatened to destabilize wartime propaganda tropes. 
0mm 
The X1OI could not have predicted the long-term effects of the Silent Column 
campaign of Jule 1940. In its immediate aftermath, the campaign raised a furor 
among the public, the press, and in Whitehall. In many ways, the 1\101 was the 
victim of a unique moment in 1940. Through the Silent Column and "Cooper's 
Snoopers, " it became the object tor frustration, suspicion, and invasion fears. The 
Ministry was not protected from public admonishment by the originator of the 
whole episode-the prime minister. Responding to a question in the House of 
Commons on 23 Jule 1940, Churchill admitted "this movement to create a silent 
column has ... passed 
into ... innocuous desuetude. " He confirmed that the 
' FR 639, "Rcl"ort on -lillittg -1fi, 
" ý April 1941, M-O A. 
FR 878, "«'hat Does ßntain Mcan to You'" 2' September 1941, M-0 A. 
Points from the Rcgions, 10 lul\- 1940, TNA: I\1= 1. '264. 
Daily Report on \lorale, 16 July 1940, -1-NA: INF 1., '2(, 4. 
Stanley Baldwin, On F. t{rtla»d t 1920: 4th cd., l. ond(m, 19 . 
31ti ), 12-13. 
'` 1'oints from the Regions, 2.3 July 1940, T\A: INF 1/264. 
Daily f-: xprrcc, 24 July 1940,4. 
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campaign was to he abandoned with immediate effect. Sentences for careless talk 
were also to be reviewed. 7' The Manchester Guardian reported that the prime 
minister had "[ buried 1 the `Silent Column' with mock solemnity that both amused 
and gratified the House. "'' The MOI could not help but feel wounded by this 
public rebuke, believing that it had been given a "raw deal" and was "the unfor- 
tunate victim of circumstances. "80 Even before Churchill's statement to the House, 
the MOI had begun to insert "corrective hints" into the media to undo the 
"repressive atmosphere possibly induced by the campaign. "" However, it admitted 
that "little could he done to counteract the false impression" that those in authority 
believed "morale to he low, and intended to raise it by exhortatory propaganda. "82 
Nevertheless, while RIOs initially concluded that '-'[the] harm has gone too deep 
to he so quickly cured, " they reported that reassurance from the Ministry "has 
helped to relieve the public to some extent. '"' Such reassurance took the form of 
broadcasts by the Minister of Information and rebranded advertisements using a 
sentence from Churchill's response to the House on the government's commit- 
ment to security. The slogan "Join the Silent Column" was replaced with "Keep 
the Enemy in the Dark, " invoking the more successful catchphrase of December 
1939.84 As this suggests, in the aftermath of the Silent Column initiative, the MOI 
reverted to the original security campaigns of December 1939 and February 1940. 
It recognized that the earlier strategy had been more sensitive to the needs of the 
individual and struck a balance between persuasion and empowerment. Kenneth 
Clark, responsible for security propaganda in the MOI, noted of the initial careless 
talk program that "in general, people's natural way of dealing with the situation 
should he interfered with as little as possible ('defeatist' talk and jokes, for instance, 
are an ingrained English method of reacting in times of difficulty). Above all, 
gossip should not he regarded as `had' either from a psychological or a moral 
point of view. On the contrary, the free expression and interchange of thoughts 
and imaginings are both useful and good. "` Clark recognized that security pro- 
paganda needed to invest the citizen with authority and knowledge. This had the 
potential to break down rather than accentuate the gap between government and 
the public. Mass-Observation remarked in October 1940 upon the "striking degree 
of non-registration" resulting in "automatic resistance" to government publicity. 
It suggested that this emerged from public opposition to "officialdom, " the ubiq- 
uity of government exhortations and instructions, and significantly, "a growing 
gulf between the leader and the led, " the latter drawing out the "distinction 
between authority and an ordinary person. " For Mass-Observation, this distinction 
was exacerbated by war, during which the "authorities take on an almost separate 
'x House of 'Commons, 23 July 1940, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 363 19.39- 
40), col. 597-99. 
-'` 
1Nanchester Guardian, 24 July 1940,4. 
Ibid., 25 July- 1940,4. 
MOI Planning (: ommittec Minutes, 15 July 1940, TNA: INF 1/249. 
MOI Planning Committee Minutes, 8 August 1940, TNA: INF 1/249. 
Report from London, n. d., ca. 22 Jul' 1940, TNA: INF 1/264. 
K4 Daily Express, 26 Juh" 1940,2. 
Handwritten notes on anti-gossip campaigns, Tate Gallery Archive, Clark Papers, 8812.1.1.275, 
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Figure 3-Keep It Dark (TNA: INF 2/95) 
existence, " reducing the citizen to a "spectator rather than actor. "" This, Of course, 
was the hallmark Of the Silent Column campaign but did not feature as prominently 
in earlier security initiatives. 
Propaganda campaigns Could easily generate a sense of distance between the 
message and the intended target. Mass- Observation detected that the recipient 
"Unconsciously associate[s direct appeals] not with me but with Other people who 
are not me or mine, but vague VOUs, people Of Other class or level of intelligence, 
or passing hikers or girls with kiss curls or old dears with flannel petticoats. "' The 
"Keep It bark" campaign, however, transformed the idea of "YOU" in official 
propaganda. Rather than "that ghostly body of close-lipped automatons" created 
by the "Silent Column, "" here "the l. OU is somebody clever, who knows things, 
who has private information, who is up to the secrets of the military, who is not 
an interior, `civilian morale' character" (see fig. 3). " Such techniques were rep- 
licated in the poster shown in figure 4 for distribution in barracks, as well as in 
MOI "l eil Minute Talks" tOr \'OUng people, which afforded yOUth a sense Of 
agency and personal responsibility. "' 
The "Fougasse" posters (. see fig.: ), the centerpiece of the February 1940 anti- 
gossip campaigns, were also reissued after the tailurc of the Silent Column. They 
became an enduring aspect of British wartime culture, such that their images and 
slogans became common reference points and appeared in various contexts. Ad- 
vertisers traded on the slogan "Careless Talk Costs Lives" to sell products from 
cheese ( "Don't spread rumours; spread V'elveeta")"j to hoot polish (, for examples 
A. 
y' FR 448, "Rchcºrt tr()m NlasN-Ohccrvattcýn on Personification 1'rcýccc"cc, " 1(1 October 1940, M-(1 
FR 2 "(; ývcrnnlent Postcrs in \\'arttme, " Octcýhcr 19; 9, ti7, , %%1y-y;, 
" Dadv Mirror, 23% August 1940,10. 
FR 448, "Relx)rt from Mass-Observation on 1'crsmnit; catlcýn Preccsscs, " 10 October 1940. M-O 
A. Emphasis In the onginal. 
"Ministry (it' Intimmatlon. Ien Minute Talks. Number h. A Talk for YOun1; PeOPlc. How Chatter 
Helps Haler, " TNA: INF 
"' 1)aili, Mirror. ?, Fehruarv 1940,1.;. 
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Figure 4-You Know More than Other People poster (TNA: INF 2/95) 
of advertisements, see fig. 6). '2 They were the focus of cryptic clues in the limes 
crossword. " There was even a racehorse named Careless Talk. `' 
The appropriation and longevity of the campaign slogans were explained by 
Kathleen Peace", writing for the Daily Mirror in September 1942: "As a nation, 
we like funny labels best. I take the careless talk posters to heart just because they 
are funny, and not dictatorial or pompous. ""-' Fougasse recognized that hectoring 
appeals against gossip could create a "sense of shame ... or 
tear" with individuals 
feeling "innocent and injured. " Moreover, given that "fear closes the mind, instead 
of opening" it, he argued, only humor could prompt the masses to internalize the 
message through depersonalization, stripping the propaganda of its accusatory 
Picture Post, 20 February 1943,6. 
The Times, 4 October 1941,6. 
The Times, 22 September 1942,2. 
Daily Mirror. 14 Sentember 1942.7. 
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Figure 5-"Fougasse poster, " 1940 (TNA: INF 3/0229) 
tone. " Countering the views offered by Mass-Observation, for Fougasse, deper- 
sonalization was a positive psychological force. By using "formula figures-that 
is, 
... 
figures that don't bear a real resemblance to real people, " Fougasse sought 
to represent "humanity in general" with the effect that ``it can ... stand 
for 
anybody and therefore for evervbodv yourself included. "'- By representing "hu- 
manity in general, " the MOI could export the posters to support security cam- 
paigns in allied nations. Despite the doubts of the Australian Department of In- 
formation that neither "the London `Punch" style of humour represented in the 
Fougasse posters, " nor the intervention of a British artist "would he appreciated 
by Australians, " they proved a considerable success, generating "keen demand" 
Fougasse, 
... 
And the Gatepost (L)ndon, 1940), viii-xi. 
Ibid.. viii-xi. 
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Figure 6-Advertisements from national newspapers using careless talk themes. The Vclveeta 
advertisement as seen, e. g., in Daily Mirror, 27 February 1940,15; and the Cherry Blossom 
advertisement as it appeared in, e. g., Picture Post, 20 February 1943,6. The image has been 
reproduced with the kind permission of Cherry Blossom. Every attempt has been made to contact 
Kraft (the makers of Velveeta), but no reply has been received. 
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in Perth, Brisbane, and Hobart. They were reprinted in Australian newspapers 
sponsored by local businesses, the Sun News devoting its prime advertising spot 
every Friday in June 1940 to the designs, courtesy of Henry Buck's, a well-known 
clothing store. 9 
Not only could comedy transcend national barriers, it operated just as well within 
them by trading on shared national characteristics. Fougasse claimed that "the 
British tradition does not like having its dangers dramatized and it doesn't want 
its patriotism dramatized either. "`'`' The MOI recognized that "our people respond 
to humour sometimes more than to serious injunctions, " 1`0 and it was with this 
in mind that they chose to re-release Fougasse's posters as a countermeasure to 
the austerity of the Silent Column. 
While the reissue of the Fougasse posters may support historian Marion 'ass's 
conclusion that the MOI retreated to "soft sell" in the aftermath of the Silent 
Column, this ignores the nature and tone of later security propaganda and the 
fact that security propaganda was not the sole responsibility of the MOI. 101 Not 
everyone agreed that the dangers of careless talk could be hammered home using 
humor. Representatives of the three branches of the Armed Services pointed out 
in an Inter- Departmental Meeting on Anti-Gossip in March 1940 that "the dangers 
of gossip was hardly a subject fbbr light treatment such as that of the Fougasse 
designs. "" Humor, they argued, concealed the consequences of indiscretion, a 
view underscored by Mass-Observation in their investigations of the slogan "Be 
like Dad, Keep Mum": while amusing, the message was not taken seriously by the 
public. " These debates reflected the tensions between and the differing needs of 
government departments and highlighted interagency conflict over the ownership 
of the careless talk campaigns. In the face of the MOI's "soft sell" and their 
reluctance to pursue a more direct campaign in the wake of the Silent Column 
initiative, the War Office took it upon itself to counter "the whimsical Fougasse 
posters" by producing "a film that would shock the troops into discretion. ""° 
That film was Next of Kin, directed by Thorold Dickinson. '° 
. Neat of, 
Kin interweaves a series of indiscretions and fifth column actions that 
culminate in a thwarted attack on the fictional port of Norville. Major Richardson 
(Reginald Tate), a security officer, is despatched to Brigade headquarters to alert 
", "Fougasse Posters, " National Archives of' Australia, Canberra: Records of' the Department of 
lntormation, SP 11211 /426/4/21. 
Fougasse....: -l And the Gatepost, viii-xi. 
Press Conference Statement, MOI, 6 February 1940, TC 42, M-O A. 
"" lass, hits Is Your tiiar, 25. 
"'= Summary Report of an Intcr-1)epartmental Meeting on Anti-Gossip, 7 March 1940, TNA: HO 
144/219775). 
"" FR 442, "Report from Mass-Observation on the Slogan 'Be like had, Keep Mum, " /7 Octob r 
1940, M-O A. This was also the case with the short film You're 7ellinq Mc. FR 639, "Report on the 
Film You're 7cllit q Me, " ä April 1941, M-O A. 
"" Nottingham Journal, 11 March 1942. It is interesting to note the crossover between these cam- 
paigns, however. A number of careless talk posters, including those of the Fougasse series, can he seen 
in the background on Next of Kin. See Antonia Lant, Blackout: Reinventing Women for Wartime British 
Cinema (Pnnccton, NJ, 1991 ), 37. 
"" Next of Kin has been the subject of much scholarly discussion. See esp. Anthony Aldgatc and 
Jcffrcý Richards, Britain Can Take It (L<)ndon, 1986), 96-115, Clive Coultass, "British Cinema and 
the Reality of War, " in Britain and the Cinema in the Second World War, ed. Philip M. 
Taylor New 
York. 1988). 84-100. 
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officers and men to the dangers of careless talk and to oversee security measures 
in advance of a planned operation. His warnings remain unheeded, and both 
officers and men relay the details of the planned raid to fifth columnists and Nazi 
spies (Mr. Navies, "Ma" Webster, and Mr. Barratt), who send intelligence to Nazi 
commanders. Enemy forces lie in wait for the British troops and careless talk results 
in the unnecessary death of British servicemen. Nett of Kin was originally conceived 
as a twenty-minute forces instruction film'° and marked a renewed emphasis in 
careless talk propaganda for servicemen, the primary focus of security campaigns 
after 1941. `Through its public release in May 1942, the film became a showcase 
for the Army's conception of careless talk propaganda. 
`Whereas Fougasse sought to create identification through humor and distancing, 
. 
NNezt of Kin invested the slogan "careless talk costs lives" with a graphic visual 
reality. Documentary filmmaker Edgar Anstey remarked in the Spectator that Dick- 
inson's film "breaks from old studio taboos in that it depicted the devastating 
consequences of indiscretion for an army unit on operations in a fictional raid on 
a French seaport. No one who sees the final sequences, " he concluded, "with the 
bloody realism of the hand-to-hand fighting and the circle of horrifyingly unex- 
pected Nazi tanks, artillery and dive-bombers closing in on the trapped and dis- 
appointed men, will be inclined to forget that modern tactics depend on surprise, 
and surprise depends on silence. """ 
Despite the War Office's hopes that Next of Kin would be more effective than 
humor in suppressing careless talk, it too did not encourage the public to identify 
with the government's message. While audiences clearly understood the moral of 
the film, they also exhibited a certain amount of distancing, which was apparently 
correlated with socioeconomic status. Mass- Observation detected a pronounced 
class reaction, with viewers in the lower social groupings being "inclined to make 
excuses for the `Tommy', to feel sorry for him, and to treat him as if he were not 
quite responsible for his actions. " The officers were to blame, with the characters 
in the viewers' own social groupings, with whom they would most likely identify, 
being exonerated. "'`' Worse still, Dickinson was "absolutely harrowed" on being 
confronted by an elderly woman who informed him that "I've got two sons abroad 
fighting, and I shan't sleep until they come home. " Such anecdotes were supple- 
mented by reports that viewers "had been carried out [of the cinema after] ... 
fainting. ""' These reactions confirmed Mass-Observation's findings that anti-ru- 
mor campaigns mainly affected "the psychologically unbalanced and acutely ner- 
vous minority, " while the majority were hardly moved to act at all. "' Next of Kin, 
then, not only intensified the existing trend of popular dissociation from govern- 
ment messages, it also drew audiences toward at least three of the five "menaces 
to public calm" identified by the MOI in June 1940: fear, suspicion, and class 
"' Interview with Thorold Dickinson, January 1977, British Film Institute (BFI) Special Collections, 
Thorold Dickinson papers, box 48, item 1. 
See, e. g., Daily Mirror, 16 July 1941,4; Daily Express 9 February 1942,2. 
The Spectator, 22 Max' 1942. 
FR 1342, "Next of Kin Film, " 7 July 1942, M-O A. 
Interview with Thorold Dickinson, January 1977, BFI Special Collections, Thorold Dickinson 
papers, box 48, item 1. 
"' FR 539, "Note on Rumour. " 8 January' 1941, M-O A. 
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feeling. 12 This reaction draws attention to the difficulties inherent in the MOTs 
wider security campaigns. Clark realized that anti-gossip propaganda had "been 
either comic or horrific. " By 1942, it was clear that neither approach had the 
desired effect; both exacerbated distancing or induced fear. "; 
But Next of ' Kin highlighted a further dilemma that had been present from the 
outset: like previous careless talk campaigns, it challenged the government's image 
of "social solidarity" and the concept of a collective "popular conscience" or 
"people's mind. ""' The very nature of the message the propagandists had to 
forward-that "walls have ears" and that the nation was awash with fifth columnists 
and traitors lurking in every corner, ready to seize upon even the smallest snippet 
of information-detracted from appeals to neighborliness and community, and 
bred suspicion. This paradox resulted in observable tensions in official wartime 
narratives, such as the People's War, tensions that surfaced once again in the later 
`ears of the conflict. 
m00 
People's War propaganda relied on the image of a community united under the 
strain of war, invested with a steely determination to defeat the enemy. Its strength 
lay in a sense of shared values, the will to work together, and cooperation with 
fellow citizens, regardless of social difference. However, the careless talk campaigns 
inferred that "fellow citizens" were not necessarily the friends and neighbors de- 
picted in official propaganda: they could also be fifth columnists, spies, or even 
just gossips 'whose indiscretion could undermine the war effort. Here the enemy 
was generalized to the point where it included everyone. This message, a significant 
part of the Silent Column campaign, continued to prove inherently problematic 
for British propagandists in the Second World War. 
Fifth columnists were portrayed in security propaganda as average men and 
women who blended seamlessly into communities, indistinguishable from the av- 
erage Briton. In Dickinson's Veit of Kin, "Ma" Webster (Mary Clare) and timid 
bookshop owner Mr. Barratt (Stephen Nturray) are barely noticed. Mervvn Johns's 
character, the inconspicuous Mr. Davies, was "an ordinary little man, " as the film's 
press hook commented, "just a typical looking Englishman who has worked in 
this country for years before the war. There is nothing mysterious about him, and 
that's what makes him so dangerous. " Drawing attention to the widespread interest 
in the fifth column and the dominance of "spy mania" in popular culture, United 
Artists, the film's distributor, reminded viewers that "popular imagination usually 
conjures up a vision of a glamorous, exotic female or a mysterious-looking, furtive 
man. Films and hooks have always in the past helped to build up this illusion. In 
real life, your spy is the most ordinary person in the world. There is nothing 
romantic about him. He might even he the man who is working next to you all 
"= Home Morale Emergency Committee report to Policy Committee, 4 June 1940, TNA: INF I/ 
250. 
Minutes, Home Planning Committee, 14 March 1940, TNA: INF 1 12,50. 
Harris. "War and Social History, " 32. 
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day long.... [ `Mr Davies' is] to all intents and purposes a humble British working 
man of the same type as thousands of others. That's your real spy! "' 
Dickinson's characters echoed earlier propaganda that focused on the confused 
identity of the infiltrator. The animated short film Clothes and the Man (1941) 
used overlays to depict how the Nazi could assume the outward appearance of 
the average Briton. Mirroring the MOI's May 1940 campaign to expose "Fifth 
Column Tricks, " the 1941 film charts the costumes and guises of the Nazi spy: 
the local man "in a nice country pub having his pint with the best of 'em, but 
also taking in with his ears any chance remark he might overhear when you're 
talking shop with your pals"; a vicar, "very much "Let us pray, " spelt P-R-E-Y, of 
course ... very 
interested in earthly matters as well as things above. A real sky 
pilot, if you understand what I mean"; a "good 'ol Cockney ... might meet 
'im 
anywhere. 'Axing a day off in the country or som'it. Knows 'is onions alright. 
Not 'alf he don't"; a "quite ordinary sort of chap ... always ready to stand a 
drink and get into conversation with you.... [Affecting an "Oxford" accent I got 
a special job in one of the factories, making all sorts of gadgets. ... 
You may 
think you're getting something out of him. But it's ten to one that he's trying 
to get something out of you. 
Ministry propaganda emphasized that "in other countries the most respected 
and neighborly citizens turned out to he fifth columnists when the time cane. " 
Attempting to undermine the view that saboteurs and spies were only to he t6und 
in the interred and refugee communities, the MOI reminded the public that "the 
fifth column does not consist only of foreigners. ""' As such, suspicion fell on the 
inconspicuous men and women of the "People's Community" who had the po- 
tential to be the unnoticed fifth column prowling every pub, railway carriage, 
telephone booth, and barber shop. As Clothes and the Man demonstrated, this 
villain was polymorphous, adopted numerous guises, and was able to blend seam- 
lessly_ into the fabric of everyday life. While Britons were clear that their country 
was "a home for decent people and undesirables are not welcome, "' defining 
the "undesirable" and identifying the enemy was becoming increasingly difficult 
in the light of the careless talk campaigns, particularly, as the MOI constantly 
reminded the public that spies and fifth columnists were likely to adopt the guise 
of the "ordinary" man or woman, barely distinguishable from their neighbor. This 
was a propaganda message that was detrimental to broader appeals to the collective 
spirit. The Home Planning Committee admitted that it had real potential to "cause 
ordinary people to look at each other [differently], with suspicion. " '9 
That the fifth columnist could blend in anywhere also threatened the idea of 
the communal space in the public imagination. In direct opposition to People's 
War rhetoric, which emphasized community locations as places of togetherness 
"; Press book, Next of Kin, BFI. This was also a message that could he exported. J. Edgar Ho. x ver, 
director of the FBI, commented on the release of the film in the United States, that German agents 
operating in the United States were "ordinary people. " Universal promotions book, Next of Kin, BFI 
Special Collections, Thorold Dickinson Collection, box 7, item 7. 
"" On the MOI campaign, see "Fifth Column Tricks, " TNA: INF 1/333. Clothes and the Man 
(Analysis, 1941), AMY 136, Imperial War Museum Films Division. 
Ministry of Information Speakers Notes, "The Fifth Column, " 29 June 1940, TNA: INF 1/251. 
"x FR 878, "What Docs Britain Mean to You? " 20 August 1941, M-O A. 
"`' Home Planning Committee Minutes, S May 1940, TNA: INF 1/249. 
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and solace, careless talk propaganda risked reinventing them as places of danger, 
deception, foolishness, and suspicion, infiltrated by an unknown enemy, who could 
be your comrade or your neighbor. Nowhere is this tension more apparent than 
in the representation of the public house. 
In many ways, the dominant narratives of the People's War were encapsulated 
in the pub. Viewed by the journalist Thomas Burke in the Preston Herald, as the 
home of "true democracy" and the ultimate expression of "Britishness, " the pub 
was "a place where all are equal.... In that centre of mutual tolerance and the 
operation of our easy English good humour, men recognise not their difference, 
but their common nature.... The bar makes people what they should be-kind, 
impulsive, and generous without calculation. ""') However, in the government's 
careless talk campaigns, the pub was reconfigured as a place of suspicion and 
danger, where individuals were urged to mind their own business, running counter 
to the public's understanding of community. 
The pub was a particular target for anti-gossip campaigners. Earlier in the war, 
Guinness was enlisted by the MOI to produce anti-gossip posters for their cus- 
tomers, while letters were sent to the Brewers' Society and several smaller breweries 
by the MOI in March 1940 to encourage publicans to "use their authority if they 
heard undesirable gossip in their public houses, and to rebuke such gossipers in 
public. "12' The Military Police were already "keeping public houses under obser- 
vation with a view to reporting cases of harmful gossip by members of His Majesty's 
Forces, "' 12 2 and the Metropolitan Police were seriously considering "organized 
visitations" 12; to pubs in order to "secure evidence of harmful gossip" by either 
members of the Services or civilians. t 24 Had this been widely known, it would no 
doubt have prompted lively protests along similar lines to the reaction to the Silent 
Column campaign. This scheme was eventually rejected, not because it presented 
an affront to democratic freedoms but because it was considered "impractical and 
undesirable" in terms of public prosecutions. 12 However, the pub continued to 
be an important mechanism for the distribution of the Ministry's security publicity, 
and its dangers remained a central theme in their careless talk propaganda. 
In Dickinson's 1942 film, Nett of Kin, the pub or the bar was the location for 
many indiscretions: Miss Clare, the morphine addict and good-time girl, is party 
to the careless talk of officers over a cocktail, while fifth columnist "Ma" Webster 
gleans valuable information over a pint at the local. In another sequence, a par- 
12" Thomas Burke, "Democracy in Being: In the Bar All Are Equal, " Preston Herald, 19 March 
1943. Cited in Rose, -Which People's War? " 4-5. This idea is also seen in George Orwell, The Lion 
and the Unicorn. - Socialism and the English Genius (London, 1962), pt. 2. 
12' On Guinness, see Minutes of Planning Committee, 23 September 1940, TNA: INF 1/249: on 
the Brewers' Society, see MOI Summary Report of an Inter-Departmental Meeting on the Anti-Gossip 
Campaigns, 7 March 1940, TNA: HO 144/21975; and Note by_ the Minister of Information, "Com- 
mittee on Issue of Warnings against Discussion of Confidential Matters in Public Places, " 13 March 
1940, T'E'A: CAB 67/5/29. 
122 MO I Summary Report ofan Inter-Departmental Meeting on the Anti-Gossip Campaigns, 7 March 
1940, TNA: HO 144//. 2.1975. 
12' Letter from Wells to Waterfield, 23 April 1940, TNA: HO 144/219"75. 
121 Memo from Commissioner of the Police of the Stctrop<olis, 17 April 1940, TNA: HO 144, 
21975. 
12S Letter from Wells to Waterfield, 23 April 1940, TNA: HO 144/21975. 
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Figure 7-MOI posters used in the promotion of Next of Kin (TNA: INF 2/95) 
achutist uses opportunities for intelligence gathering afforded by the drunken 
behavior of the platoon at the train bar. Similar scenes are played out at a canteen 
dance where "over a drink ... a sergeant 
blurts out the most vital information 
of all about preparations for troop movements" in front of the undetected spy 
played by Johns. 126 The press hook for Next of'Kin pointed to the dangers of bar 
talk, and United Artists suggested cinema tie-ins with ý'ý10I posters, including two 
that represented the puh. ' 
The tensions in the presentation of the pub in the careless talk campaigns are 
represented in these two posters (fig. 7). In the first poster, the public house is a 
place for healthy, masculine bonding, representative of desirable behavior. Yet in 
the second poster, the pub is the setting for indiscreet talk. 
The combination of alcohol and female allure was seen as a particular threat. 
This was brought out in another poster of 1942 (see fig. 8), intended for distri- 
bution in officers' messes. '`x 
The poster accentuated the themes brought out in Dickinson's film of the same 
year, also intended primarily for the troops. Historian Antonia Lant points to the 
evocative dissolve from male officers discussing security to the image of Miss Clare 
Press book fh>r 't'ext of Kin (Dickinson, 1942), BFI. 
Ibid. "Test of a Soldier" was available in a 15 inch by 10 inch size and "That Kind of Talk Sinks 
Ships" in a 30 inch by 20 inch and a 20 inch by I-) inch. 
" http: //vº-A-u-. nationalarchives. gov. uk/theartoh%, ar/prop/home_tront/INF3_0229. htm. 
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Figure 8-Careless Talk poster for the commissioned ranks (TNA: INF 3/0229) 
"in a halter neck dress with almost hare midritt, dancing on stage before an 
audience. " The following line links the two sequences: "Let me know where you 
think wt"c're weakest. " Lant concludes that this "juxtaposition through editing 
implies that the answer ... 
is night-club w omen, which in the film's terms is true. " 
In both the poster shown in figure 8 and in the artwork for Next of Kin, the 
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viewer's eve is drawn to "explosive female lips, "''' heavily made-up to heighten 
"sexual openness [and] disguise. """ 
This potent combination of alcohol and sex disturbed the authorities. Alcohol 
was a lubricant for loose tongues, and women were generally depicted as gossips. 
In their extensive studies of pub culture, Mass-Observation reported that the 
combination of alcohol and young women was generally perceived as dangerous 
and immoral-such a powerful sentiment that Sonya Rose contends that it was 
often seen as more important than class in determining popular "Othering. ""' 
The presence of women was seen to undermine the "male stronghold" of the pub, 
"imped[ing] male sociability" and counteracting male bonding and community 
spirit. Women drinking alone or in all female groups were thought to be "not 
quite ladylike, " with Mass- Observation confirming that many respondents thought 
that women ought to be accompanied by a male escort to reduce the chance of 
undesirable behavior. ' 2 Such views were reflected in later careless talk campaigns, 
in which lone women or female groups in search of male attention were presented 
as particularly subversive or careless, or encouraging indiscretion in men. 
The best example of this is the 1943 Army short film Missed Date, in which 
servicemen Toni, Mike, Bill, and Harry decide on an evening out in a pub in a 
sleepy country town. The pub is initially depicted as "truly a cosy place with a 
neat little bar and a dart hoard too, and a host with a cheery face ... 
[a J home 
from home, 
... where everyone seemed a 
friend, " images that connected to 
official People's War propaganda. Indicative of the subversion of and challenge to 
these narratives, the tone of the film quickly changes when Bill and Harry spot a 
couple of women with "two saucy smiles. " Pursuing their "favourite indoor sport, " 
Bill and Harry make a date with the two women for Saturday. Bragging to the 
women, they disclose that, "there's a big do on, though we mustn't say, we know 
what it's all about. " On Saturday, the women wait in vain for their dates. Bill and 
Harry had been at the aerodrome when "Jerry" launched a raid. While the two 
women ponder why they had been abandoned, an inconspicuous man in the corner 
keeps his head down: "the date fell through, as the boys are dead. But the tact 
never came to light that the man in the pub who dozed nearby got his message 
away that night. Never forget that wherever you are, there are listening ears. "'"; 
Not only then was the presence of women seen to he disruptive to male bonding 
and community building, undermining the overall government message that 
women were solid and trustworthy citizens playing their part in the People's War, 
the pub was transformed from a place of patriotic social interaction into one where 
dangerous elements lurk behind every corner. '; ' 
12Y Iant, Blackout! 76-79. 
`; " Page Dougherty Delano, "Making Up four War: Sexuality and Citizenship in Wartime (vulture, " 
Feminist Studies 26, no. 1 (2000): 39. 
'; ' Rose, "Sex, Citizenship, and the Nation, " 1166. 
132 FR 1635, "Women in Public Houses, " 30 March 1943, M-() A. 
Missed Date (Analysis Films, 1943), AMY 59, Imperial War Museum Films Division. 
Christian Delporte, "The Image and Myth of the Fifth Column during the Two World Wars, " 
in France at War in the 20th C; enturv: Propaganda, Mvth and Metaphor, cd. Valerie Holman and Debra 
kelp- (Oxford, 2000), 61. The reconfiguration of community areas and reflections upon the individual's 
place within them was not simply a British phenomenon. Similar trends can he observed in anti-gossip 
propaganda on mainland Europe. Delporte observed of France that "far from calming tears, the image 
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Missed Date was released during renewed security activity surrounding build- 
up to the plans for the invasion of mainland Europe. Anti-gossip campaigns for 
the Armed Services intensified once again from 1943, suggestive of the changing 
security battleground. New campaigns were launched in mid-1943 and again in 
May 1944. "As the tempo of preparations for invasion quickens, " the Daily Express 
told its readers, "everyone in Britain is asked to obey this slogan: `Don't pass it 
on! '" The article emphasized that much careless talk continued to emanate from 
service personnel . 
1' By 1943, as this suggests, prominence was given to the armed 
forces in security propaganda, shifting attention away from ordinary citizens 
whose role was now confined to keeping information quiet rather than anti- 
gossip. Convictions continued to be publicized in the press, although without 
the vitriol that accompanied earlier reports and without discussion of the demo- 
cratic rights of citizens at war, reflecting the changed context in which propagan- 
dists now operated. 
Propaganda from 1943 tended to focus on communications security, a particular 
issue for the Services. The Directorate of Army Kinematography, who had recruited 
Thorold Dickinson as head of production following the success of Next of'Kin, '36 
was charged by the General Staff with producing a series of short films warning 
of potential security breaches through the telephone and letter. This was reinforced 
with poster propaganda designed for distribution in messes and barracks. In this 
new wave of security publicity, private as well as public spaces became targets. 
Private letters, phone conversations, and even diaries could disclose valuable in- 
formation to the enemy (see fig. 9). 
In Hush! Not a Word! a 1943 animated film from Anson Dyer's Analysis studios, 
details of a new secret weapon are divulged by a "Tommy" wanting to boast to 
his girlfriend, the information reaching Hitler and Goebbels who immediately 
order their bombers to raze the airfield. The film ends with the strap-line: "Don't 
write it, even to your sweetheart. 
A similar message is conveyed in the 1943 film Chattcrbuij, which opens with 
a careless "Tommy" hogging a telephone box oblivious to the gathering crowd 
outside, while the narrator points out that "most people seem to think that they 
are cut off from the outside world when they are on the telephone ... 
but speech 
on the telephone is not secret. ... 
Don't think you're safe just because you are 
in an empty room. ""S The film details the numerous ways in which telephone 
conversations may he overheard: through the switchboard, through careless "jab- 
ber" in public spaces, and through "closed" and crossed lines. Chatterbisrg and 
Hush! Not a Word! functioned by emphasizing the interplay between the "private" 
communication and the public arena, with overheard conversations and the passing 
of information invariably taking place in public houses, on a railway, or at the 
hairdressers. This, once again, encouraged suspicion of others, notably through 
the inadvertent passing on of information: "even though the person who overhears 
(of enemy infiltrator%I strengthened them by hearing witness to the presence of enemy ears, " with 
French bistros and cafes, like the Bntish pubs, normally "convivial institutions which favour conversation 
and exchanges" becoming potential sites of danger. 
Daily F_tprrss, 1 May 1944,1. 
Aldgate and Richards, Britain Can lake It, 105. 
Hush! Not a Word! ( 1943(, AMY 56, Imperial War Museum Films Division, London. 
' "' (hattrrbuq ( 1943), T)RA 465/01-02, Imperial War Museum, Films Division London. 
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Figure 9-Diary and telephone poster campaigns (TNA: INF 2/95) 
yOU may not he an enemy agent, well, there are plenty Of loudmouthed people 
in this country ready to broadcast everything they know and a lot they can Only 
guess. "'-'" Both films also featured sequences involving the exchange of inf()rmation 
with women, and this continued into the final phase of security propaganda f()1- 
lOwwing the invasion of Europe on 6 June 1944. Careless Talk, released by Strand 
Film just a month later, depicted the consequences of the revelations of "love- 
lorn John Jones" to "indiscreet Mary Brown. """ 
In the final months of the war, it was largely accepted that security propaganda 
was necessary and that the natural urge to gossip, such a treasured national pastime, 
had to he curbed. The Daily Mirror urged its readers to resist the temptation to 
speculate on events in France. It pointed out that "the excitement that is gripping 
us makes us all the more careless.... Careless talk was had enough in the days 
of preparation. Now-in the days of vital action-it is criminal folly. "' This 
marked a considerable shift from the presentation of civil defense convictions in 
May-July 1940, and the campaigns of 1944-45, like those of December 1939 
Ibid. 
Careless talk shooting script, general release date 17 July 1944 (except Pathe and Paramount 
who released the film on 6 Jul' 1944), TNA: INY 6/197. 
"' Daily Mirror. 8 June 1944.7. 
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and February 1940, largely passed without press or public criticism. Events were 
not as pressing in the "phoney war" or on the cusp of victory as they were in the 
charged days of May-July 1940. As this suggests, tracing the campaigns through- 
out the war years not only demonstrates their successes and their limitations: it 
acts as a window onto the morale of Britons at war. 
000 
As Duff Cooper, Minister of Information, wrote in July 1940, the careless talk 
campaigns and exhortations to community through the loose framework of the 
People's War were intrinsically linked. `Yet the two propagandistic strands pushed 
against rather than complemented one another. This was true not only in terms 
of the nature of the campaigns but also in their inherent messages, creating tensions 
in Britain's wartime propaganda campaigns. The Ministry found itself in an im- 
possible position, having to promote the idea of community while at the same 
time maintaining security by identifying potential dangers 'within. Consequently, 
historians should confront the complexities of wartime propaganda narratives and 
the interactions between them; they should also consider the ways in which cultural 
products and propaganda more generally were consumed by the public. Propa- 
ganda did not exist in a vacuum: it was seen by the public in the round, and this 
meant that to be successful, it had to be consistent. That contemporaries noted 
the tensions in British wartime propaganda makes it all the more surprising that 
scholars have either largely ignored the campaigns in their accounts of 'wartime 
Britain or failed to explain their position in relation to appeals to the collective 
such as the People's War. This was an unstable propaganda narrative, particularly 
when set alongside other campaigns, such as those of the Silent Column and its 
later manifestations. Official People's War propaganda was not as homogenous as 
some scholars have suggested, nor was it as powerful in a complex media and 
social environment in which many different and conflicting ideas were at work. 
Most importantly, campaigns concerned with issues of security had significant 
social consequences. The fissureswithin and across propaganda campaigns revealed 
pressures on the relationship between authority and the individual, between the 
state and the public, and between the rights and responsibilities of the citizen at 
times of national emergency. The idea of the individual was a well-established 
British tradition. Arguably, appeals to wartime unity brought the importance of 
the individual into sharp relief in terms of a traditional British political construct, 
which even the most skilled propaganda could not override, and this too affected 
the dynamics of the propaganda of community. Behaviors and mentalities were 
central to the popular sense of national identity. Within this context, a counter- 
narrative developed that was based around opposition to state interference with 
the individual. While "[stepping] out of line" rendered the individual "antisocial, " 
it nonetheless did not prevent people from doing so in relation to careless talk, 
since the message seemed, in the public mind, seriously to jeopardize individual 
freedoms. 14' Here representations of individual freedoms could not be framed in 
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terms of the collective, since it was perceived to come dangerously close to the 
totalitarian model. 
Propaganda was, therefore, playing a specific role, where deep horizontal com- 
radeship was challenged by confused identities, accentuated by the fifth column 
scare, and characterized by the inadvertent redefinition of community spaces, mu- 
tual suspicion between the citizen and state, and a volatile relationship between 
the individual and authority. This seems to confirm Harris's contention that the 
war saw a "strengthening and legitimation of a highly privatised and unstructured 
psychological individualism. " 44 While there is some truth to this statement, an- 
other possibility also presents itself. While there were tensions within the official 
attempts to condition a "people's community" through overt propaganda cam- 
paigns, it was paradoxically in response to those campaigns-and their counter- 
point, the careless talk campaigns-that the power of the People's War idea 
emerged. The campaigns inadvertently sharpened the sense of community from 
below and became a means through which Britons themselves defined concepts 
of unity and what they were fighting for and what they were fighting against, as 
the public response to the Silent Column demonstrated. The careless talk initiatives 
may have undermined the official propaganda narratives of community, but they 
reinvigorated and forged others. It was not necessarily propaganda that defined 
the People's War but responses to it. Images of unity and disunity, and the behaviors 
they encouraged, existed side by side: a sense of community could emerge despite 
government failure to project it adequately. It follows, therefore, that historians 
should look for new, more complex ways of understanding the dynamics of wartime 
propaganda that take account of the unforeseen outcomes of specific campaigns 
and place more emphasis on public agency in constructing their own meanings 
from official communications. 
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